

## Inequality-aware Market Design Seminar Series

# Arseniy Samsonov: Bargaining over Information Structures (special in-person talk)

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### Details

**When:** 5 Jul 2023 @ 17:00 GMT+2

**Where:** GRAPE

### Speaker this week

**[Arseniy Samsonov ↗](#)**

Budapest University of Technology

**Arseniy Samsonov** is a postdoc at the QSMS research group at the Budapest University of Technology. His research areas are political economy and economic theory. Currently, he looks at the role of information in politics from a game-theoretic point of view. His previous work used game theory and data analysis to study the welfare of ethnic minorities under different political regimes.

**Abstract:** How transparent are informational institutions if their founders have to agree on the design? We analyze a model where several agents bargain over persuasion of a single receiver. We characterize the existence of an agreement that is beneficial for all agents relative to some fixed benchmark information structure, when the preferences of agents are state-independent, and provide sufficient conditions for general preferences. We further show that a beneficial agreement exists if, for every coalition of a fixed size, there is a belief that generates enough surplus for its members. Next, we concentrate on “agent-partitional” environments, where for each agent there is a state where the informed decision of the receiver benefits her the most. In these environments, we define endorsement rules that fully reveal all such “agent-states”. Endorsement rules are Pareto efficient when providing information at all agent-states generates enough surplus, and they correspond to a Nash Bargaining solution when the environment is also symmetric. Finally, we discuss the implications of our model in the context of political bargaining among the authoritarian elites over institutions and political parties over electoral campaigning in multiparty elections. Find the paper [here ↗](#).

Should you have any queries please contact the seminar organizers at [IMD@grape.org.pl](mailto:IMD@grape.org.pl).

