

Inequality-aware Market Design Seminar Series

Eduardo Perez-Richet: Fraud-proof non-market allocation mechanisms

Relevant Links

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Details

When: 6 Sep 2023 @ 17:00 GMT+2

Where: GRAPE

Speaker this week

[Eduardo Perez-Richet ↗](#)

Sciences Po

Eduardo Perez-Richet is an Associate Professor of Economics at Sciences Po. He is primarily interested in Microeconomic Theory, Game Theory, Information Economics, and Political Economics.

Abstract: We study the optimal design of fraud-proof allocation mechanisms without transfers. An agent's eligibility relies on a score reflecting social value, but gaming generates misallocations, mistrust, unfairness and other negative externalities. We characterize optimal allocation rules that are immune to gaming under two classes of gaming technologies. We examine the impact of demographic changes on allocations within and across identifiable groups, while accounting for resource and quota constraints. Fraud-proof allocation rules enhance fairness and trust in allocation systems at the cost of some allocative efficiency. Find the paper [here ↗](#).

Should you have any queries please contact the seminar organizers at IMD@grape.org.pl.



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