

Sophie Alexandra Kreutzkamp

University of Bonn, Department of Economics
Office Contact: ECONtribute
Niehburstraße 5
53113 Bonn, Germany

sophie.kreutzkamp@uni-bonn.de
sites.google.com/view/sophiekreutzkamp
+49-176-52484894

Education

2017 – 2023 (expected)	Ph.D. student in Economics, University of Bonn
2021 – 2022	Visiting Assistant in Research, Yale University
2019	M.Sc. in Economics, University of Bonn (with distinction)
2016	B.Sc. in Economics, University of Bonn

Research

Interests

Microeconomic Theory, Information Economics, Search and Matching Theory, Mechanism Design

Working papers

Endogenous Information Acquisition in Cheap-Talk Games (JMP)
On-the-Match Search and Match-Specific Productivity Growth (with Axel Niemeyer and Finn Schmieter)
Clustering with a Minimum Distance Constraint

Work in progress

Stable Matching with Two-sided Incomplete Information

Presentations and Conferences

2022	Yale Micro Theory Lunch, Midwest Economic Theory Conference, Bonn Micro Theory Workshop, 7th Lindau Meeting on Economic Sciences, 10th CRC TR 224 Conference, EWMES 2022 (scheduled)
2021	8th CRC TR 224 Workshop for Young Researchers
2020	Bonn Micro Theory Workshop
2019	Bonn Brown Bag Seminar

Research Experience

2022	Research Assistant to Prof. Rohini Pande, Yale University
------	---

Teaching Experience

Spring 2022	TA for Intermediate Microeconomics, Yale University, Prof. Roland Strausz
Fall 2021	TA for Intermediate Microeconomics, Yale University, Evangelia Chalioti
Summer 2015, 2016, 2017, 2019	TA for Statistics B, University of Bonn, Prof. Lorens Imhof/ Prof. Alois Kneip
Winter 2016/17	TA for Microeconomics B, University of Bonn, Frank Rosar
Winter 2014/15 & 2015/16	TA for Statistics A, University of Bonn, Prof. Lorens Imhof/ Prof. Alois Kneip

References

Prof. Dezső Szalay
University of Bonn
Department of Economics
Phone: +49-228-733926
Email: szalay@uni-bonn.de

Prof. Benny Moldovanu
University of Bonn
Department of Economics
Phone: +49-228-736395
Email: mold@uni-bonn.de

Prof. Philipp Strack
Yale University
Department of Economics
Email: philipp.strack@gmail.com

Awards and Fellowships

2019 – present	Fellowship of the Cluster of Excellence ECONtribute
2019	Excellence in Teaching Award (Statistics B, Summer 2019)
2017 – 2019	Fellowship of the BGSE for Ph.D. students
2015	Excellence in Teaching Award (Statistics A, Winter 2014/15)
2014 – 2017	Funding by Deutschlandstipendium
2013	Award by DMV (Deutsche Mathematiker-Vereinigung) for outstanding achievements in Mathematics

Miscellaneous

Citizenship:	German
Languages:	German (native), English (fluent), French (fluent), Latin
Programming Skills:	Matlab, R

Dissertation Abstract

Endogenous Information Acquisition in Cheap-Talk Games (JMP)

This paper studies costly information acquisition and transmission. An expert can communicate with a decision-maker about a state of nature by sending a cheap-talk message. I establish a version of the recommendation principle, meaning that the sender generally reveals all acquired information to the decision-maker in efficient equilibria. Furthermore, I show existence of efficient equilibria under general conditions. For the class of posterior separable cost structures, I derive properties of efficient experiments. Under posterior-mean preferences, any cheap-talk problem is solved by a convex combination of two *bi-pooling policies*. Beyond that, I characterize the best bi-pooling policies for the uniform-quadratic case. Contrary to existing cheap-talk models, monotone partitions are not always optimal.

On-the-Match Search and Match-Specific Productivity Growth (with Axel Niemeyer and Finn Schmieter)

We study a search-and-matching model with heterogeneous agents that continue to search on-the-match. In deciding with whom to match, agents must trade-off the flow utility provided by a partner against the stability of a match, i.e., the rate at which the partner leaves for another agent. Thus, stability determines and is determined by the agents' behavior, and consequently, there are multiple steady state equilibria. In almost every equilibrium, agents coordinate on payoff-dominated behavior. However, if there is match-specific productivity growth, i.e., if flow utility increases in the duration of a match, agents no longer fail to coordinate. We characterize the set of steady state equilibria that survive a perturbation with match-specific productivity growth. In some equilibria, less productive agents prefer to match with other less productive agents, suggesting an alternative explanation for assortative matching. In general, productivity growth can significantly alter equilibrium outcomes and sorting patterns: any match now becomes stable in the long run, but there is an incentive to foster growth in matches that are stable to begin with; either effect can dominate the agents' trade-off.

Clustering with a Minimum Distance Constraint

This paper studies the k -means clustering problem with one additional constraint: The distance between any two cluster centroids is bounded below by some constant. Specifying the minimum distance between cluster means determines the optimal number of clusters. I characterize analytical properties of the solution to the constrained clustering problem. The classical k -means clustering algorithm extended by the minimum distance constraint typically converges to an outcome that is a local solution, but cannot be the global solution to the clustering problem. Moreover, I propose a hypothesis test on uniformity of the underlying distribution of the original data based on the clustered data.

November 1, 2022