On February 5, 2025, at the Frisch Centre Seminar, Magda presented their latest research on statistical discrimination in the labor market. The study explores how access to individual performance information impacts wage allocation decisions, providing new insights into labor market biases and decision-making processes.

The concept of statistical discrimination, originally introduced by Phelps (1972) and Arrow (1973), suggests that employers use group-level statistics as a proxy for individual productivity. This study examines whether providing individual performance information can mitigate such biases and lead to fairer wage distributions. The research employed a controlled laboratory experiment with university students acting as managers responsible for allocating wages. 

When only statistical information was available, managers tended to allocate wages according to pre-established group differences. Upon receiving actual performance data, 60-70% of managers adjusted their wage allocation strategies, often shifting towards merit-based decisions. In male-typed task (solving equations), managers were more likely to transition from fairness-based to profit-maximizing strategies when provided with individual performance information. In female-typed task (emotion recognition), shifts were less pronounced.

We are grateful to the audience for their fruitful discussion and valuable suggestions, which will help shape the future direction of our research.