gmbara

gmbara's picture

Gilbert
Mbara

Gilbert joined GRAPE to work on taxation & efficiency project.





W toku | Work in progress

  • Corporate Governance, Taxation and Business Cycles

    We present an agency model of corporate tax auditing by a residual claimant government and embed it into a macro model with financial constraints. In our economy, entrepreneurs with access to risky investment technologies raise funds by issuing equity claims to new capital. Information asymmetries create incentives to choose a riskier but cheaper technology that provides private benefits and opportunities to evade taxes. Random auditing by the government for tax verification reveals technology choice, reducing the asymmetric information problem between lenders and borrowers. We show that moderate corporate governance quality accompanied by high taxes raise output, investment and consumption.

    Non-technical summary: Unintended consequences of Mr Taxman

    Ryszard
    Kokoszczyński
    Gilbert
    Mbara
  • Striking a balance: optimal tax policy with labor market duality

    We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model in which firms may evade the employer contribution component of social security taxes by offering some workers “secondary contracts”. When calibrated, the model yields estimates of secondary labor market participation consistent with empirical evidence for the EU14 countries and the US. We investigate the optimal mix of the avoidable and unavoidable components of labor taxes and analyze the fiscal and macroeconomic effects of bringing the composition to the welfare optimum. We find that partial labor tax evasion makes tax revenues more elastic, but full tax compliance need not be a welfare enhancing policy mix.

    Ryszard
    Kokoszczyński
    Gilbert
    Mbara
    Joanna
    Tyrowicz