Analyzing the efficiency of the pension reform: the role for the welfare effects of fiscal closures

Pension system reforms involve fiscal consequences. In practice, a variety of fiscal closures may be implemented, while not all of them involve the same extent of distortions. This paper develops an overlapping generations model to analyze the case of a shift from pay-as-you-go defined benefit system to a partly funded defined contribution system. We calibrate the system to mimic the economy of Poland, which actually implemented such reform in 1999. We analyze the efficiency of the reform with two main closure types: public debt and taxes. Regardless of the fiscal closure scenario this particular reform seems to be efficient in terms of welfare and enhances economic performance. Comparing the welfare of various closures we find that while labor taxation yields relatively higher welfare gain, public debt closure involves least need for the redistribution if capital pillar is to be implemented.

This paper was awarded Joseph A. Schumpeter Prize from Deutsche Bundesbank.

Unpublished version

@article{makarski_hagemejer_tyrowicz_2017, title={Analyzing efficiency of pension reform: the role of the welfare effects of fiscal closures}, volume={21}, number={5}, journal={Macroeconomic Dynamics}, author={Makarski, Krzysztof and Hagemejer, Jan and Tyrowicz, Joanna}, year={2017}, pages={1205–1234}}